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Abstract
This paper presents evidence on the behavior of output and inflation in the transition
economies during 1992-95. A regression analysis explores the differences in output
performance across the transition economies during this period. The paper then engages in a
numerical, somewhat speculative, exercise to assess the long-run growth potential ofthe
transition economies. It concludes that it should take about 20 years for the faster reformers
to rea.ch current OECD per capita levels.
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Summary
A priori speculation in the early 1990s about the nature of the economic transition in the
formerly-planned economies can now give way to a discussion ofwhat has happened so far,
and to a better-informed speculation ofwhat may happen in the future. So far, the leading
reformers of Central and Eastern Europe have moved impressively down the road to a market
economy, and most others have taken major strides toward stabilization and reform. The
output declines have stopped in all countries that have stabilized, with growth resuming in
most of them. The fear that political considerations would hinder reform unless progress was
rapid has turned out not to be valid in most countries.
This paper looks at the economic progress made so far by the transition economies, and
evaluates their long-run prospects for growth. The paper first presents data that summarize
the behavior of output and inflation in the transition economies, and then regression evidence
that seeks to account for differences in performance among countries.
The paper then turns to a numerical, but more speculative, exercise to assess the long-run
growth potential of the transition economies. Based on estimates presented in past cross-
country studies, we predict growth rates for the transition economies, which depend on initial
conditions and such control variables as investment ratios and government consumption,
which reflect government policies. Given the uneven progress in structural reforms, benefits
from both well-directed government spending on reforms and foreign direct investment in
enhancing human and physical capital are potentially large. Although admittedly crude,
projections based on standard growth regressions suggest that it will take about 20 years for
the faster reformers to reach current DEeD per capita income levels.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is now over six years since the start of the Polish economic reform program, and over four
years since the breakup of the Soviet Union. A priori speculation about the nature of the
economic transition can now give way to a discussion ofwhat has happened so far, and to a
better informed speculation-though speculation nonetheless-ofwhat may happen in future.
The story so far is that the leading reformers of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have
moved impressively down the road to macroeconomic stability and a market economy, and
that most of the remaining countries have taken major strides towards stabilization and
reform. The output costs of reform in most economies have probably exceeded expectations,2
but output declines have stopped in all countries that have stabilized and growth has begun in
most ofthem. The fear that politics would not sustain reform unless progress was rapid has
turned out not to be valid in most countries.3
In this paper, we take a look at the progress made so far by the transition economies in their
journey towards a market economy, and evaluate their long-run prospects for growth.
Specifically, the paper first presents data that summarize the behavior ofoutput and inflation
in the transition economies, and then regression evidence that seeks to account for differences
in performance among countries. The regressions, which cover the period 1992-95, update
results based on data through 1994 presented in Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1996a).4 We then
turn to a numerical, but more speculative, exercise to assess the long-run growth potential of
the transition economies.
II. RECENT EXPERIENCE IN THE TRANSITION ECONOMIES
In this section we examine the behavior of GDP growth and inflation for 26 economies in
transition in eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Mongolia. Most of the data used in
this paper have been provided by IMF economists working on these countries.5 It is well
known that these data are likely to suffer from serious biases. In particular, the output data are
subject to both conceptual and measurement problems. At a conceptual level, prices before
the transition were out of line with both costs and world prices, and goods were in any case
2We believe this to be true even taking account of data imperfections that generally overstate
the decline of output.
3Aslund, Boone, and Johnson (1996) make a convincing case that reformers have done well at
the polls.
4To the extent possible, we will make the presentation self-contained, referring to previous
results in footnotes.
5See Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh (1996a) for details on data definitions, sources, and limitations.
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often not available at those prices. As relative prices change in the transition process and
resources move towards sectors whose prices have risen, output declines in base prices are
overstated relative to declines measured at world or new prices. The measurement problems
are mostly related to the fact that as state sector output declines and private sector output
rises, an increasing share of output tends not to be recorded given that statistical
services-some ofwhich had to be built essentially from scratch-are still rudimentary.
A. Basic Macroeconomic Indicators
Tables 1-3 show annual output and inflation data for the 26 transition economies since 1989.6
Several facts stand out:
• Output declines during the transition have been very large. Table 1 presents annual
output growth data for the 26 countries in our sample for the period 1989-95. As of
1995, the reported average cumulative output decline during the transition process
was 41 percent (Table 3). In several countries, reported output has fallen by around
two-thirds, which would indicate a virtual collapse of the economy. While these data
are surely exaggerated, output declines have nonetheless been dramatic.7 The output
decline was most severe in the former Soviet Union countries dependent on intra-
republican trade and in those that suffered civil war or trade embargoes-Armenia,
Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Tajikistan and Ukraine in the FSU, and Croatia and
Former Yugoslavian Republic ofMacedonia (FYRM) in CEE (Table 3). To gain some
perspective, recall that output in the United States declined by 34 percent during the
Great Depression. Even though there were surely better reform strategies than those
actually pursued, the creative destruction of the transition process would have implied
large output declines even under the best policies.8
• The worst is over in most economies: as of 1995, 14 out of the 26 economies in our
sample had begun to grow. Growth began as early as 1993-94 in most CEE and the
Baltics, but by 1995 was not yet apparent in the official data for two-thirds of the FSU
countries.
6Data for China and the Indochinese economies in transition are not included in this study.
7Kaufinann and Kaliberda (1995) construct estimates of output that draw, among other
variables, on electricity consumption. They conclude that the overall GDP decline during
1989-94 was 17 percent in CEE and 33.4 percent in the former Soviet Union.
8Sachs (1996) makes the case that a substantial and coordinated aid effort in 1992 would have
made the Russian reform process much more successful.
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Table 1. Annual Output Growth in Transition Economies, 1989-95
Country 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Albania 9.8 -10.0 -28.0 -7.2 9.6 9.4 8.6
Annenia 14.2 -7.2 -11.8 -52.3 -14.8 5.3 5.0
Azerbaijan -4.4 -11.7 -0.7 -22.1 -23.1 -21.1 -13.2
Belarus 7.9 -3.2 -1.2 -9.6 -10.7 -19.1 -10.2
Bulgaria -0.5 -9.1 -11.7 -7.3 -2.4 1.4 2.5
Croatia -1.5 -8.5 -20.9 -9.7 -3.7 0.8 -1.5
Czech Republic 1.4 -1.2 -14.2 -6.4 -0.9 2.6 4.8
Estonia -1.1 -3.6 -11.9 -21.6 -8.4 3.0 4.0
Georgia -4.8 -12.4 -20.6 -44.8 -25.4 -11.3 -5.0
Hungary 0.7 -3.5 -11.9 -3.0 -0.8 2.9 1.7
Kazakhstan -0.4 -0.4 -18.8 -13.9 -12.0 -25.0 -8.9
Kyrgyz Republic 3.0 4.0 -5.0 -19.3 -16.1 -26.2 1.3
Latvia 3.0 -2.3 -11.1 -35.2 -14.8 2.0 0.4
Lithuania 1.5 -5.0 -13.4 0.0 -18.4 1.0 3.5
Macedonia, FYR 0.9 -9.7 -10.7 -21.1 -8.4 -8.2 -3.0
Moldova 8.8 -1.5 -18.0 -29.1 -1.2 -31.2 -3.1
Mongolia 4.2 -2.0 -9.2 -9.5 -3.0 2.1 6.3
Poland 0.2 -11.6 -7.0 2.6 3.8 6.0 6.5
Romania -5.8 -7.4 -12.9 -8.8 1.3 3.9 6.9
Russia 3.0 -2.0 -12.9 -19.0 -12.0 -15.0 -4.0
Slovak Republic 4.5 -0.4 -15.9 -6.7 -4.7 4.8 7.4
Slovenia -2.7 -4.7 -8.1 -5.4 1.3 5.5 4.0
Tajikistan -2.9 -1.6 -7.1 -29.0 -11.0 -21.5 -12.5
Turkmenistan -7.0 -2.3 -4.8 -5.3 -10.2 -20.0 -13.9
Ukraine 4.1 -3.6 -11.9 -17.0 -13.0 -21.8 -11.4
Uzbekistan 3.7 4.3 -0.9 -11.0 -2.4 -3.5 -1.2
Sources: National authorities; International Monetary Fund; The World Banle
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Table 2. Annual Inflation in Transition Economies, 1989-95
(period average)
Country 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Albania 0.0 0.0 35.5 225.2 85.0 22.6 7.8
Armenia 2.0 5.6 100.3 824.5 3,731.9 5,273.4 176.8
Azerbaijan 2.0 7.8 61.4 912.6 1,129.7 1,664.4 411.7
Belarus 1.7 4.5 94.1 969.9 1,187.9 2,222.1 709.0
Bulgaria 6.4 23.9 333.5 82.0 n.8 96.0 62.1
Croatia 1,200.0 609.2 122.6 663.3 1,516.0 97.5 2.0
Czech Republic 1.4 9.5 56.7 11.1 20.8 10.0 9.1
Estonia 2.0 23.1 212.5 1,069.3 89.0 47.7 28.3
Georgia 0.9 3.3 78.5 888.3 3,126.3 17,246.2 169.0
Hungary 16.9 29.2 34.2 23.0 22.5 18.8 28.2
Kazakhstan 2.0 4.2 90.9 1,513.7 1,662.3 1,879.9 176.3
Kyrgyz Republic 2.0 4.2 85.0 853.8 1,208.7 278.1 42.8
Latvia 4.7 10.5 124.7 951.1 109.0 35.8 25.1
Lithuania 2.1 8.4 224.7 1,020.5 410.4 n.l 36.5
Macedonia,FYR 1,246.0 608.4 114.9 1,692.6 334.5 122.6 17.4
Moldova 4.5 110.0 162.0 1,276.4 788.0 329.4 30.2
Mongolia 0.0 0.0 20.2 202.8 268.4 88.3 56.8
Poland 251.1 600.0 76.4 43.0 35.3 32.2 27.8
Romania 0.9 4.7 161.1 210.3 256.0 136.8 32.0
Russia 2.4 5.7 92.7 1,353.0 896.0 301.1 190.2
Slovak Republic 1.4 10.8 78.3 10.1 23.1 13.4 9.9
Slovenia 1,306.0 549.7 117.7 201.3 32.3 19.8 12.8
Tajikistan 2.0 5.6 111.6 1,159.8 2,194.8 350.4 635.4
Turkmenistan 2.0 4.2 102.5 493.3 3,102.4 1,748.9 1,261.5 .
Ukraine 2.0 3.0 94.1 1,210.0 4,734.9 891.2 376.4
Uzbekistan 0.7 4.0 105.0 645.5 534.2 1,568.3 304.6
Sources: National authorities; International Monetary Fund; The World Bank.
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Table 3. Inflation and Output Performance in Transition Economies, 1989-95
Year in Year in Year in Cumulative Cumulative
Which Which Annual Which Output Output
Inflation Maximum Inflation Inflation Output Decline Growth
was Annual Fell Below in 1995 was (1989=100) Since Lowest
Country Highest II Inflation II 50% II 2/ II Lowest 31 31 Level 41
Albania 1992 236.6 1993 6.1 1992 39.9 30.2
Armenia 1993 10,896.2 1995 32.1 1993 66.7 10.5
Azerbaijan 1994 1,788.0 84.5 1995 64.0
Belarus 1993 1,994.0 244.5 1995 43.9
Bulgaria 1991 338.8 1995 32.9 1993 27.4 3.9
Croatia 1993 1,149.7 1994 3.7 1993 37.0
Czech Republic 1991 52.1 1992 7.5 1993 21.4 7.5
Estonia 1992 946.7 1993 28.8 1993 35.3 7.2
Georgia 1993 7,487.9 62.3 1995 75.9
Hungary 1990 34.6 n.a. 28.5 1993 18.2 4.7
Kazakhstan 1992 2,566.6 60.4 1995 58.1
Kyrgyz Republic 1993 1,365.6 1995 31.5 1994 50.6 1.3
Latvia 1992 958.2 1993 23.3 1993 52.0 2.4
Lithuania 1992 1,162.6 1994 35.5 1993 32.9 4.5
Macedonia, FYR 1992 1,927.3 1995 9.3 1995 48.1
Moldova 1992 2,198.4 1995 23.8 1995 62.3
Mongolia 1992 325.0 53.6 1993 21.9 8.6
Poland 1989 639.6 1992 24.2 1991 17.8 20.2
Romania 1993 295.5 1995 27.2 1992 26.4 12.5
Russia 1992 2,510.4 131.4 1995 50.3
Slovak Republic 1991 58.3 1992 17.3 1993 25.5 12.6
Slovenia 1991 246.7 1993 8.6 1992 16.0 9.7
Tajikistan 51 1993 7,343.7 2,131.9 1995 60.3
Turkmenistan 1993 9,743.0 1,906.7 1995 45.5
Ukraine 1993 10,155.0 181.4 1995 57.5
Uzbekistan 1994 1,232.8 112.0 1995 14.3
All transition economies 71 2,602.1 204.2 41.1
Eastern Europe and Baltics 71 619.0 19.5 30.6
FSU and Mongolia 71 4,585.1 388.9 51.6
Sources: IMF staff estimates; national authorities.
1/ Inflation calculated from December to December.
2/ A "••" indicates that inflation was above 50 percent during the transition years, as of 1995. In Hungary's case, this criterion is not applicable
because inflation was below 50 percent even before 1989.
31 Output decline from 1989 to the year in which output was lowest. For countries in which output has not begun to grow, 1995 is taken as the
year ofminimum output. GDP measured on an annual average basis.
41 Lowest level refers to the lowest output level reached during 1989-95. A "--" indicates that no positive growth has been recorded as of 1995.
51 Although inflation in 1994 was only 1.1 percent, it was a temporary phenomenon caused by a shortage ofbank notes.
61 Output revived marginally (0.8 percent) in 1994 and then declined by 1.5 percent in 1995.
71 Simple average.
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• Inflation rates have been extremely high in the transition process, higher in the former
Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia than in other countries. In only three
countries-the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Hungary-did annual
inflation remain below triple digits throughout. In two countries-Armenia and
Ukraine-it reached more than 10,000 percent in the year of maximum inflation.9 All
countries in the former Soviet Union (except the Baltics) experienced inflation of more
than 1,000 percent in the year of maximum inflation. Maximum inflation rates were
significantly lower in CEB. In most countries, there was an initial jump in inflation,
associated with price liberalization and devaluation. This can be thought of as primarily
a price level change (see Sahay and Vegh (1996». In most countries, but less so in
CEE, inflation increased in subsequent years, but has declined in virtually all countries
since then.
• Inflation stabilization is succeeding. By 1995, the average inflation rate (measured
December-to-December) in CEE and the Baltics was only 20 percent per annum.
Although inflation was about 390 percent in the former Soviet Union and Mongolia,
inflation was below half that level in nine of those 12 countries (Table 3).
The detailed data presented in Tables 1-3 are summarized in Figures 1-3.10 Panel (a) in
Figure 1 shows the (unweighted) average growth rate of measured real GDP since
1989-which we take to be the year in which the transformation process began-through
1995. Measured growth has on average been negative in every year (but was close to zero in
1995). The growth rate reached a trough in 1992, reflecting the effects of the breakup of the
Soviet Union and the collapse of CMEA trade. The growth rate then increased, but remained
negative. The corresponding plot for the level of real GDP in panel (a) in Figure 2 shows that,
on average, GDP in 1994 was about 60 percent of its initial level. The year 1995 saw a virtual
stop to the process of output decline.
It is clear from Tables 1 and 3 that the behavior of output differs between, on the one hand,
the CEE and Baltic countries (EEB) and, on the other hand, the countries of the former Soviet
Union (excluding the Baltics) and Mongolia (FSUM). We therefore present output profiles in
levels and growth rates for these groups of countries in Figures 1 and 2 in panels (b) and (c),
respectively. The average level of output reached a minimum in EEB in 1993, and has since
begun to grow (Figure 2, panel (b». At that point, output had fallen 30 percent below the
1989 level. In the FSUM countries, output continued to fall through 1995, albeit at a declining
rate. The level in 1995 was less than 50 percent of the 1989 level.
9Inflation in these countries would have met the classic Cagan definition ofhyperinflation,
more than 50 percent per month. Serbia, for which we do not have complete data, also
suffered from a hyperinflation.
lOpor reasons explained later Turkmenistan is excluded from the time profiles.
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Figure 1. Real GDP Growth Profiles in Calendar Time 1/
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Figure 2. Real GDP Index Profiles in Calendar Time (1989=100) 1/
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Figure 3. Average Inflation Profiles in Calendar Time 1/
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The pattern of inflation since the start of the transition process is presented in Figure 3.
Inflation increased dramatically from 1991 to 1994. The process turned around in 1995 when
average inflation declined sharply. Separate profiles for the EEB and FSUM countries show
that inflation in the EEB remained well below the levels in the FSUM, and turned down
sooner.
B. Stabilization and Growth
Figures 1-3 highlight the differences between the output and inflation profiles of two groups
of countries: Eastern Europe and the Baltics, and the former Soviet Union and Mongolia. In
this section, we argue that one key difference between the two groups is the date in which
countries started their stabilization programs. In so doing, we will also argue that there is a
typical profile of output and inflation that may be expected to develop around the time of
stabilization.
As Table 4 documents, countries started their stabilization plans at different dates. According
to IMP economists working on those countries, stabilization attempts have been implemented
in 25 of the 26 countries, with Turkmenistan being the exception. For each country we list the
date on which the stabilization program was implemented. The date given is the starting date
ofa country's inflation stabilization program, and not necessarily the starting date of an IMP
program. When several stabilization attempts have been made (which was the case in six
countries), we take the most serious attempt (as of end-1995) as the reference date. ll
The third column of Table 4 indicates the exchange rate regime adopted during the
stabilization program. Countries that announced an exchange rate peg, including a crawling
peg, are classified as having a fixed rate regime. In two cases-Croatia and the former
Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia (FYRM)-the exchange rate regime is classified as a peg on
the basis of the policies actually implemented, even though the authorities did not explicitly
announce it as such. Several FSU countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, and the Kyrgyz Republic) that began their stabilization programs under a flexible
exchange rate regime had begun to peg de-facto their currencies to the U.S. dollar by 1995
and are listed as flexible/fixed. Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia are also listed as flexible/fixed
because they had flexible rate regimes at the time of stabilization but later moved to a fixed
rate.
llThe choice of a particular stabilization date, when there have been multiple attempts,
necessarily requires a judgment call. We have tried to make this judgment on the basis of the
policy package associated with the stabilization attempt, rather than on ex post inflation
performance.
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Table 4. Stabilization Programs in Transition Economies, 1989-95
Exchange Pre-Program
Stabilization Regime Inflation
Country Program Date Adopted (I2-month) 1/
Albania August 1992 Flexible 292.6
Armenia December 1994 FlexiblelFixed 2/ 1884.5
Azerbaijan January 1995 FlexiblelFixed 2/ 1651.0
Belarus November 19943/ FlexiblelFixed 2/ 2179.8
Bulgaria February 1991 3/ Flexible 244.6
Croatia October 1993 Fixed 1902.8
Czech Republic January 1991 Fixed 45.5
Estonia June 1992 Fixed 1085.7
Georgia September 1994 FlexiblelFixed 2/ 56476.2
Hungary March 1990 Fixed 26.0
Kazakhstan January 1994 FlexiblelFixed 2/ 2315.4
Kyrgyz Republic May 1993 FlexiblelFixed 2/ 934.0
Latvia June 1992 FlexiblelFixed 4/ 817.8
Lithuania June 1992 FlexiblelFixed 4/ 708.7
Macedonia, FYR January 1994 Fixed 247.7
Moldova September 1993 Flexible 1089.7
Mongolia October 1992 3/ Flexible 281.6
Poland January 1990 Fixed 1096.1
Romania October 1993 3/ Flexible 314.3
Russia April 1995 3/ FlexiblelFixed 4/ 218.4
Slovak Republic January 1991 Fixed 45.9
Slovenia February 1992 Flexible 288.4
Tajikistan February 1995 3/ Flexible 73.0
Turkmenistan Not started Not applicable 1906.7
Ukraine November 1994 Flexible 645.1
Uzbekistan November 1994 Flexible 1555.1
All transition economies 5/ 840.4
Eastern Europe and Baltics 5/ 547.4
FSU and Mongolia 5/ 1157.8
Sources: IMF estimates; The World Bank; national authorities; De Melo, Denizer, and
Gelb (1995).
1/ Inflation in the twelve months previous to the month of the stabilization program. For
Turkmenistan, the figure is for the latest year available (1995).
2/ As of 1995, these countries adopted a de-facto peg to the U.S. dollar.
3/ The date of the most serious stabilization attempt.
4/ The Latvian currency was pegged to the SDR in February 1994; Lithuania adopted a
currency board in April 1994. Russia announced an exchange rate corridor in July 1995.
All three countries had flexible exchange rate regimes prior to these dates.
5/ Simple averages for all variables; excludes Georgia's extreme inflation value.
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Given that countries started their stabilization programs at different points in chronological
time, we have computed output and inflation profiles relative to the date of stabilization; that
is, in "stabilization time. ,,12 Stabilization time is denoted by T+j, where T is the year in which
the stabilization program was implemented and j is the number of years preceding or following
the year of stabilization. 13
The shift from chronological time in Figures 1-3 to stabilization time in Figures 4-6 changes
the picture dramatically. Panel (a) in Figure 4 shows large negative rates ofGDP growth until
the year of stabilization. Output growth then begins to recover, with GDP growth becoming
positive two years after stabilization. The corresponding pattern in terms of levels is shown in
panel (a) in Figure 5. Panel (a) in Figure 6 shows that inflation, in turn, peaks in the year
before stabilization, falls sharply when the stabilization plan is implemented, and remains low
thereafter.
Since there were systematic differences in the date of stabilization between the countries of
the former Soviet Union and those of eastern Europe, the stabilization time profiles in Figures
4-6 represent a changing population of countries. In particular, the observations for T+3 and
T+4 come from eastern Europe and the Baltics, rather than from the other republics of the
former Soviet Union.
We now want to examine whether the time profiles, where they overlap, are essentially
similar. In Figures 4 and 5 we present output growth and level profiles in stabilization time for
the two groups of countries. Growth in the EEB countries was negative and declining up to
the year of stabilization (Figure 4, panel (b». Real GDP growth turned positive two years
after stabilization. Indeed, by 1996 output has begun to grow in all these countries. Output
levels for EEB are shown in Figure 5 in panel (b). For the FSUM group, panel (c) in Figures 4
and 5 show that the level of output has been declining continuously. The shape of the real
GDP index profile is very similar to that for the EEB countries. Of course, average GDP for
the EEB countries never fell as low as it did for the FSUM countries.
120fthe 26 countries in the sample, Turkmenistan was excluded in computing profiles in
stabilization time because there has been no stabilization attempt as ofend-1995.
13The number of observations for each year in stabilization time is likely to differ (see Fischer,
Sahay, and Vegh (1996a) for details). For the purposes of the time profiles shown in the
paper, we report averages only for those years in stabilization time for which there are at least
3 observations.
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Figure 4. Real GDP Growth Profiles in Stabilization Time 1/
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Figure 5. Real GDP Index Profiles in Stabilization Time 1/
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1/ The sample comprises the 26 countries mentioned in the text, except Turkmenistan which had no
stabilization program as of 1995.
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Figure 6. Average Inflation Profiles in Stabilization Time 1/
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Inflation profiles in stabilization time are presented in Figure 6. The pattern shown in the
different panels is similar, with inflation peaking one year before or in the year of stabilization
and then declining sharply. However, inflation in the EEB economies never reached the levels
that it did in the former Soviet Union. After stabilization, the average rate of inflation in EEB
quickly fell below 100 percent, and then below 50 percent, although the scale of the chart
makes this difficult to discern.
Underlying the behavior of output and inflation are significant changes in fiscal policy. These
are illustrated in Figure 7. In chronological time, for the whole sample (panel a), the deficit
increased markedly until 1992, and improved afterwards. Panel (b) in Figure 7, in stabilization
time, shows very large average fiscal deficits early on, followed by a significant improvement
in the years leading to stabilization and, with a brief interruption, continued improvement. In
stabilization time, the profiles for the two groups of countries are broadly similar, but the
fiscal situation in FSUM was on average significantly worse than that in EEB. Overall, the
behavior of fiscal balances roughly mirrors the behavior of inflation.
The simple-but essential-message that emerges from this section is that real GDP rebounds
following inflation stabilization, which in turn appears highly correlated with the improvement
in the public finances. We shall now seek to refine the basic story.
ID. DETERMINANTS OF GROWTH AND INFLATION IN THE TRANSITION
In this section we present some simple econometric evidence on the determinants ofgrowth
and inflation during the transition process. Regressions were run with the average annual rate
ofgrowth of real GDP and the logarithm of annual end-of-period inflation as the dependent
variables. As explanatory variables, we included macroeconomic policies (exchange rate and
fiscal policy), the extent of structural reforms, and exogenous shocks (the effects ofthe
CMEA collapse in 1991 and the break up of the Soviet Union in January 1992).14
The exchange rate regime (as listed in Table 4) is characterized by a dummy variable which
takes on a value of one when the exchange rate is fixed, and zero otherwise. If the exchange
rate regime changed during the sample period 1992-95 (as in some former Soviet Union
countries), we adopted the procedure of assigning the value of one (zero), if the exchange rate
regime was fixed (flexible) for more than six months in that year.
14See Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh (1995a) for details on data definitions and methodology.
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Figure 7. Fiscal Balance Profiles (Percentage of GDP) 1/
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The extent of structural reforms in each year was measured as an economic liberalization
index, LffiERAL (as computed by de Melo, Denizer, and Ge1b (1995) for the period 1989-95
based on information presented in the 1994 and 1995 Transition Report), where zero
represents an unreformed planned economy and 1 represents a fully reformed economy. This
index is a weighted average of three indices: price liberalization and competition (LII, with a
weight of0.3), trade and foreign exchange regime (LIE, with a weight of 0.3), and
privatization and banking reform (LIP, with a weight of0.4). On the basis of the yearly
liberalization index, De Melo, Denizer, and Gelb (1995) construct a cumulative liberalization
index (CLI) to capture the speed and depth of reforms over the 1989-95 period. The trade
disruptions caused by the breakups of the CMEA and the Soviet Union in 1992 were
summarized by a dummy variable (Y92), which takes a value of 1 for the year 1992 and zero
otherwise.
For the purpose of this econometric exercise, we considered the period 1989-95 period and
thus excluded the period 1989-91. The main reason for excluding the period 1989-91 is that
we found it difficult to characterize macroeconomic policy in more than half the countries
before 1992-namely in the former Soviet Union and Albania. In particular, it makes little
sense to use the same definitions for the exchange rate regime of the pre and post-reform
period.
To carry out the econometric analysis, we pooled the cross-section and time series data for all
25 countries for four years, 1992-95.15 To capture fixed effects, we allowed the intercept to
vary across countries. This formulation enables us to test whether there are differences across
countries (presumably reflecting omitted variables), modeled as parametric shifts in the
regression function.
The role of the exchange rate regime in stabilization and growth has long been a subject of
controversy. A strong case can be made for using the exchange rate as a nominal anchor in
reducing inflation in transition economies (Sahay and Vegh (1996) and Hansson and Sachs
15To be specific, the estimated equation for the pooled cross-section time-series regressions
takes the form:
DEPVARit = cti +PllXEDit + P2FISCALit + P3CLlit(orP4LffiERALit
or PsLIEitor B6LIIit or P7LIPit )+PgY92it +uit'
where DEPVAR is GDP growth, as defined above; I (=1, ..25) indexes the country; t (=1992,
1993, 1994, 1995) indexes time; and u is an error term assumed to be U.d over I and t and
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. FIXED is the exchange rate dummy; FISCAL is
the government balance variable (thus, a fiscal deficit takes on a negative value); CLI is the
cumulative value of the liberalization index; LffiERAL is the value of the weighted
liberalization index; LIE is the liberalization index for trade and foreign exchange regime; LII
is the liberalization index for price and competition; LIP is the liberalization index for
privatization and banking reform; and Y92 is the time dummy for 1992.
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(1995)). This case is buttressed by the fact that exchange rate-based stabilizations have often
been associated with growth rather than recession (Rebelo and Vegh, 1995; Easterly, 1995).
Our a priori expectation, therefore, was that countries with fixed exchange rate regimes
would experience a quicker revival of output. We also expected growth to be lower the larger
the fiscal deficit and the smaller the extent ofmarket-oriented reforms.
While we will use our regressions for drawing lessons, we should note that causation is in
some cases not self-evident. For instance, it is surely the case that growth may feed back into
fiscal balances through higher revenues. We find less persuasive the argument that low
inflation countries may have chosen a fixed exchange rate. In any event, good instruments are
not easy to come by. Our regressions should therefore not be viewed as reflecting deep
structural relations but rather as a convenient way of presenting the data. Further qualification
is needed given that the data are sparse and preliminary.
Table 5 reports the regression results obtained from the fixed effects model. In all cases,
country-specific effects turned out to be highly significant (using a likelihood ratio test),
indicating that there were some differences across countries which are not captured by the
explanatory variables. The regression results indicate that a pegged exchange rate regime,
tighter fiscal policy, and most measures of structural reforms affected growth positively. Thus,
we find-not surprisingly-that countries that achieved macroeconomic stabilization (through
the use offixed exchange rates and tight fiscal policy) and undertook deeper reforms are
growing faster during the transition. We also found that the break up of the CMEA and the
Soviet Union had a very large negative impact on growth. The inflation regressions strongly
support the notion that afixed exchange rate regime and lower fiscal deficits helped in quickly
stabilizing high inflation. Thus, while there is little doubt that correcting the underlying fiscal
imbalances is essential for the success of a stabilization program, a strong nominal anchor
appears to be an important component as well. Structural reforms have also helped in
lowering inflation.
Table 5. Fixed Effects Model for 25 Transition Economies, 1992-95
(T-Statistics in parenthesis)
Dependent Variable: GDP Growth Dependent Variable: Log offuflation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Fixed 11.67 9.09 5.75 7.08 6.43 10.20 8.24 -2.81 -2.61 -1.93 -1.82 -1.64 -2.45 -2.07
(3.99) (3.40) (1.90) (2.15) (1.84) (3.27) (2.70) (-6.37) (-5.90) (-4.22) (-3.88) (-3.29) (-5.32) (-4.78)
Fiscal 0.34 0.21 0.26 0.29 0.33 0.31 0.29 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06
(2.89) (1.91) (2.44) (2.60) (2.93) (2.61) (2.60) (-3.98) (-3.35) (-3.63) (-3.77) (-4.27) (-3.61) (-3.77)
Y92 -8.51 0.67
(-4.44) (2.13)
eLI 4.99 -0.74
(4.07) (-3.96)
Liberal 30.72 -6.65
(2.70) (-4.09)
LIE 22.50 -5.01
(2.54) (-3.97)
LIT 13.70 -3.31
I
(1.32) (-2.15) Nw
LIP 28.78 -6.16
(2.80) (-4.20)
R-squared 0.62 0.70 0.69 0.66 0.65 0.63 0.66 0.74 0.76 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.76 0.79
Adjusted R-squared 0.49 0.59 0.58 0.53 0.52 0.49 0.53 0.65 0.67 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.67 0.72
Likelihood ratio 67.32 78.68 57.64 53.44 53.46 57.54 60.29 79.21 81.36 61.20 59.10 62.18 53.34 77.44
Probability value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Number of
observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Authors' calculations.
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IV. GROWTH PROSPECTS IN THE LONG-RUN
The previous section focused on the factors that have affected growth during the transition to
a market economy. As the transformation process continues, the forces higWighted in Table 5
are likely to become less important, and will be taken over by the neo classical determinants of
growth. This section is devoted to addressing long-term growth prospects in transition
economies. Given the short period of time elapsed since the transition process began, any
meaningful estimation of long-term growth parameters for transition economies is precluded.
Our methodology will therefore consist of drawing upon past cross-country studies of the
determinants ofgrowth to make predictions for the transition economies. Assuming that the
structural relationships estimated in previous studies are robust, we predict rates of growth for
the transition economies, conditional on initial conditions and various control variables (such
as investment ratios and government consumption), which are taken to reflect government
policies. While admittedly crude--and subject to obvious and some more subtle
criticisms-we view this exercise as providing a very rough idea of the long-term growth
potential of these economies. 16
Table 6 presents information on some long-run determinants ofgrowth for those transition
economies for which a full data set was available. Data are presented for the latest available
year. Thus, population growth rates are for 1993 (source: World Bank); primary and
secondary school ratios are mostly for 1993, otherwise one or two years before 1993
(sources: World Bank, and Krajnyak and Zettelmeyer (1996»; gross capital formation is for
1995 (sources: IMF and DECD), exports and government consumption (in percent ofGDP)
for 1995 (source: IMF); and initial per capita income in U.S. dollars on a purchasing power
parity basis is for 1994 (sources: World Bank and IMF).
16 In addition, these rates ofgrowth should be viewed as a long-term average. Based on
neoclassical growth theory, one should expect that the initial growth rates would be higher
than these averages and then decrease over time as they converge to DECD levels.
Table 6. Factors Affecting Long-term Growth in Transition Economies
Primary School Secondary School Exports of Government
Enrollment Enrollment Gross Capital Per Capita Goods and Consumption
Population (share of (share of Formation Income Services Expenditure Inflation
Growth school age school age (share ofGDP) in US$ (share ofGDP) (share ofGDP) in 1995
Rate population) population) in Current Prices PPPBased in Current Prices in Current Prices (period average)
(\VB) (\VB) (\VB,KZ) (WEO,OECD) (WB,IMF) (IMF) (IMF) (IMF)
1 Albania 1.19 0.96 0.79 0.17 495 0.13 0.12 7.8
2 Azerbaijan 1.28 0.89 0.83 0.24 1,720 0.41 0.13 411.7
3 Bulgaria -0.35 0.86 0.71 0.12 4,280 0.50 0.17 62.1
4 Croatia 0.06 0.87 0.80 0.10 3,872 0.41 0.30 2.0
5 Czech Republic -0.06 0.99 0.89 0.31 7,940 0.52 0.20 9.1 N1J1
6 Estonia -0.31 0.83 0.92 0.30 6,634 0.68 0.21 28.3
7 Hungary -0.53 0.94 0.81 0.23 7,010 0.32 0.10 28.2
8 Latvia -0.53 0.83 0.92 0.18 5,170 0.41 0.20 25.1
9 Macedonia, FYR 1.12 0.87 0.80 0.38 1,604 0.45 0.14 17.4
10 Moldova 0.41 0.77 0.81 0.12 2,270 0.44 0.23 30.2
11 Poland 0.20 0.98 0.83 0.16 5,480 0.27 0.18 27.8
12 Romania 0.19 0.86 0.80 0.30 2,950 0.28 0.14 32.0
13 Russia 0.55 1.07 0.92 0.26 4,510 0.22 0.17 190.2
14 Slovak Republic 0.35 1.01 0.96 0.22 6,730 0.65 0.20 9.9
15 Slovenia 0.41 0.97 0.80 0.25 5,982 0.54 0.20 12.8
Average 0.26 0.91 0.84 0.22 4,443 0.42 0.18 59.6
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF), The World Bank (WB), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and Krajnyak and
Zettelmeyer (KZ:1995).
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Given the data available for these countries, we predict future growth prospects using an
equation of the form:
get) = f{Yo, PSo, SSo; INV(t), GOV(t), POP(t»,
+ + + ?
(1)
where get) is per capita growth during the time interval t, Yo is the per capita income in the
starting year, PSo is the primary school enrollment rate (in percent of the total primary school-
aged population), SSo is the secondary school enrollment rate (in percent of the total
secondary school-aged population), INV(t) is gross capital formation (in percent ofGDP)
during the time interval t, GOV(t) is government consumption expenditure (in percent of
GDP) during the time interval t, and POP(t) is the growth rate of the population during the
time interval t.
The predicted signs from neoclassical and endogenous growth models are presented below the
explanatory variables in equation (1). Per capita growth, get), is negatively related to Yo-this
follows from the neoclassical convergence hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, poorer countries
tend to grow faster than richer ones. The primary and secondary school enrollment ratios
represent investment in human capital. Countries investing more in human capital tend to
grow faster (see Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991». Higher physical
investment ratios also increase the growth rate. There is no consensus in the empirical
literature regarding the effects ofgovernment consumption on growth (for contrasting results,
see Ram (1986) and Levine and Renelt (1992». The impact on growth should depend on the
type ofgovernment spending, as well as on the distortions associated with its financing. Some
growth models with endogenous population growth predict that per capita income and
population growth rates should move inversely because higher population growth rates imply
that a larger amount of time is spent in raising children than in other productive activities.
Referring back to the basic data in Table 6, the PPP-based per capita income (in U.S. dollars)
varies widely across countries, with Albania at the low end of the spectrum and the Czech
Republic at the other extreme. In 1994, all countries were well below the DECD country
average of$18,602. The average per capita income ($4,443) is also low from a global
perspective-by World Bank (1996) standards these are lower-middle income economies.
Given the relatively low initial per capita incomes, the convergence hypothesis predicts a
relatively faster rate ofgrowth in the future.
The most striking features in Table 6 are the extremely high primary and secondary school
enrollment ratios. Other things being equal, these ratios imply a higher growth potential.
However, despite the high level of basic education existing in most of the transition
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economies, further human capital investment is required to provide retraining in market-based
institutions, build entrepreneurial skills, and ensure technological innovation and adaptation.17
The latest available information on gross capital formation indicates that the average in 1994
stood at 22 percent ofGDP, and that there was a wide variation across countries. While this
average figure is comparable to the one prevailing in the industrial countries during the period
1950-73, it is low compared to the average of30 percent for the fast growing economies
during the period 1985-94.18
Government consumption in most countries declined sharply from a level of 50-60 percent of
GDP at the start of the transformation process, to an average level of 18 percent in 1995.19
While government consumption at the previous rates was not sustainable and must have
affected growth negatively, it is becoming increasingly clear that sharp reductions in
expenditures on the scale seen in some of the transition economies may be adversely affecting
the reform process (see, for example, Haque and Sahay (1996)). Involuntary expenditure
compression, sequestration, and a build-up of arrears have often resulted from the sharp
revenue declines and the need to reduce budget deficits for various reasons (including
stabilization, see Cheasty and Davis (1996)). Indeed, it is likely that growth would be
enhanced by more public spending on building market-based institutions, improving the
quality ofgovernment administration, and setting up a social safety net.20
Population growth rates in the transition economies are low, and in many cases negative. As
the extensive state support system for dependents, particularly children, is reduced, we would
expect a further decline in population growth rates. According to equation (1), this means
higher per capita growth. However it is also likely that population growth rates will recover
once the economic prospects for individuals in these economies become less uncertain.
17 Despite consistently high human capital indicators, Easterly and Fischer (1994) show that a
leading cause of economic decline in the former Soviet Union was the low elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor, which they argue were in part explained by lack of
entrepreneurial skills and the slow adaptation to imported technological progress.
18This group of countries includes Chile, Hong Kong, Korea (South), Malaysia, Mauritius,
Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, and Thailand (based on the IMF's World Economic
Outlook database.)
l~e have to repeat the standard warning on data: data on gross capital formation as well as
on government consumption are subject to a wide margin of error, primarily because the
demand-based UN system of national income accounting is still at a very rudimentary stage in
most of these countries.
2~eefer and Knack (1995) present empirical evidence from cross-country growth regressions
that point to the positive impact on growth of better institutions.
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Table 7 provides preliminary insights on the growth potential in transition economies by
comparing key determinants ofgrowth with past averages for slow and fast-growing countries
presented in Levine and Renelt (1992). Again, human capital indicators are extremely
favorable and so is the degree of openness of the economies. The inflation rate in 1995 was
still quite high (and much higher than the average for both subgroups) but given current
stabilization policies, we can expect the recent trend of rapid decline in inflation rates to
continue.21
To project long-term growth in transition economies, we used the equations estimated by
Barro (1991) and Levine and Renelt (1992).22 Tables 8, 9, and 10 present our simulation
results under alternative specifications. These are:
Barro growth equation:
per capita growth = 0.0302* - 0.0075* Y1960 + 0.025* PRIM
+ 0.0305* SEC -0.119* GOV
Levine and Renelt growth equation:
per capita growth = - 0.83 - 0.35* Y1960 - 0.38 POP
+ 3.17* SEC + 17.5* !NY
(2);
(3)
Here Y 1960 is the initial level of real per capita income at international prices (expressed in logs
in the Barro equation and divided by 1,000 in the Levine-Renelt equation), POP is the growth
rate of population, PRIM is the gross primary school enrollment rate, SEC is the gross
secondary school enrollment rate, GOV is the share ofgovernment consumption expenditure
in GDP, and !NY is the share of investment in GDP. (The stars next to the estimated
coefficients indicate that they are significant at least at the 5 percent level.)
21 See Fischer (1993) for evidence that inflation is negatively associated with growth.
22 We chose these equations both because they are widely quoted and because it was relatively
straightforward to obtain data for the transition economies matching the right-hand side
variables in the Barro (1991) and Levine and Renelt (1992) regressions.
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Table 7: Selected Transition Economies in a Global Perspective
Variable Fast-growers Slow-growers
Transition Economies
in 1995 1/
Primary-school enrollment rate 0.90 0.54 0.91
(in 1960)
Secondary-school enrollment rate 0.30 0.10 0.84
(in 1960)
Share of investment in GDP 0.23 0.17 0.22
(during 1960-89)
Government consumptionlGDP 0.16 0.12 0.18
(during 1960-89)
Share of exports to GDP 0.32 0.23 0.42
(during 1960-89)
Annual inflation rate 12.3 31.1 59.6
(during 1960-89)
Sources: Levine and Renelt (1992), and Table 6.
1/ Average for 15 transition economies.
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Table 8. Selected Transition Economies: Forecasting Long-Term Trend Growth (Barro)
Primary School Second. School Per Capita Government
Enrollment Enrollment Income Consumption
Population (share of (share of inUS$ Expenditure Forecasted
Growth school age school age PPP (share ofGDP) Per Capita Forecasted
Rate population) population) Based in Current Prices Growth Growth
(WB) (WB) (WB,KZ) (WB,IMF) (IMF) Rate Rate
I Albania I.19 0.96 0.79 495 0.12 6.91 8.09
2 Azerbaijan 1.28 0.89 0.83 1720 0.13 5.77 7.05
3 Bulgaria -0.35 0.86 0.7I 4280 0.17 4.28 3.93
4 Croatia 0.06 0.87 0.80 3872 0.30 3.08 3.14
5 Czech Republic -0.06 0.99 0.89 7940 0.20 4.24 4.18
6 Estonia .0.31 0.83 0.92 6634 0.21 3.98 3.67
7 Hungary .0.53 0.94 0.81 7010 0.10 5.15 4.62
8 Latvia -0.53 0.83 0.92 5170 0.20 4.27 3.75
9 Macedonia, FYR I.12 0.87 0.80 1604 0.14 5.61 6.72
10 Moldova 0.41 0.77 0.81 2270 0.23 4.10 4.51
11 Poland 0.20 0.98 0.83 5480 0.18 4.59 4.79
12 Romania 0.19 0.86 0.80 2950 0.14 5.16 5.35
13 Russia 0.55 1.07 0.92 4510 0.17 5.32 5.87
14 Slovak Republic 0.35 1.01 0.96 6730 0.20 4.66 5.00
15 Slovenia 0.41 0.97 0.80 5982 0.20 4.16 4.57
Averages 0.26 0.91 0.839 4443 0.18 4.75 5.02
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF), The World Bank (WB), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OEeD), and
Krajnyak and Zettelmeyer (KZ,1996).
Table 9. Selected Transition Economies: Forecasting Long-Tenn Trend Growth (Levine-Renelt)
Secondary School
Enrollment Gross Per Capita
Population (share of Capital Formation Income Forecasted
Growth school age (share ofGDP) inUS$ Per Capita Forecasted
Rate population) in Current Prices PPPBased Growth Growth
(WB) (WB,KZ) (OECD, WEO) (WB,IMF) Rate Rate
1 Albania 1.19 0.79 0.17 495 4.08 5.27
2 Azerbaijan 1.28 0.83 0.24 1,720 4.83 6.10
3 Bulgaria -0.35 0.71 0.12 4,280 2.16 1.80
4 Croatia 0.06 0.80 0.10 3,872 1.99 2.06 w
......
5 Czech Republic -0.06 0.89 0.31 7,940 4.66 4.60
6 Estonia -0.31 0.92 0.30 6,634 5.18 4.86
7 Hungary -0.53 0.81 0.23 7,010 3.51 2.98
8 Latvia -0.53 0.92 0.18 5,170 3.63 3.10
9 Macedonia, FYR 1.12 0.80 0.38 1,604 7.28 8.40
10 Moldova 0.41 0.81 0.12 2,270 2.94 3.35
11 Poland 0.20 0.83 0.16 5,480 2.59 2.79
12 Romania 0.19 0.80 0.30 2,950 5.80 5.99
13 Russia 0.55 0.92 0.26 4,510 4.83 5.38
14 Slovak Republic 0.35 0.96 0.22 6,730 3.63 3.98
15 Slovenia 0.41 0.80 0.25 5,982 3.78 4.19
Average 0.26 0.84 0.22 4,443 4.06 4.32
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF), The World Bank (WB), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), and Krajnyak and Zettelmeyer (KZ,1996).
Table 10. Selected Transition Economies: Forecasting GDP Convergence to OECD Countries
Barro Levine-Renelt
At Current Government Consumption Investment
Government =10 Percent At Current =30 Percent
Per Capita onsumption Rates (in Percent ofGDP) Investment Rates (In Percent ofGDP)
Income Number of Number of Number of Number of
inUS$ Forecasted Years to Forecasted Years to Forecasted Years to Forecasted Years to
(PPP Based) Per Capita Reach Current Per Capita Reach Current Per Capita Reach Current Per Capita Reach Current
(WB,IMF:1994) Growth OECDLevels Growth OECDLevels Growth OECDLevels Growth OECDLevels
I Albania 495 6.91 54 7.17 52 4.08 91 6.30 59
2 Azerbaijan 1,720 5.77 42 6.18 40 4.83 51 5.96 41
3 Bulgaria 4,280 4.28 35 5.06 30 2.16 69 5.31 28
4 Croatia 3,872 3.08 52 5.43 30 1.99 80 5.58 29
I
w
5 Czech Republic 7,940 4.24 20 5.47 16 4.66 19 4.48 19 tv
6 Estonia 6,634 3.98 26 5.29 20 5.18 20 5.13 21
7 Hungary 7,010 5.15 19 5.19 19 3.51 28 4.74 21
8 Latvia 5,170 4.27 31 5.48 24 3.63 36 5.73 23
9 Macedonia, FYR 1,604 5.61 45 6.09 41 7.28 35 5.97 42
10 Moldova 2,270 4.10 52 5.61 39 2.94 73 6.04 36
II Poland 5,480 4.59 27 5.54 23 2.59 48 5.06 25
12 Romania 2,950 5.16 37 5.61 34 5.80 33 5.85 32
13 Russia 4,510 5.32 27 6.18 24 4.83 30 5.55 26
14 Slovak Republic 6,730 4.66 22 5.85 18 3.63 29 4.98 21
15 Slovenia 5,982 4.16 28 5.35 22 3.78 31 4.71 25
Average for transition 4,443 4.75 35 5.70 29 4.06 45 5.43 30
OECD average (1994) 18,602 n.a n.a
Source: Authors' calculations
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The average per capita growth rates forecasted by Barro and Levine-Renelt's equations are
fairly close-between 4 and 5 percent per annum (Tables 8 and 9). The more optimistic
scenario for most countries, not surprisingly, is obtained by using the Barro equation
(Table 8), which gives a relatively high weight to the human capital variables. The projected
average per capita growth rate is 4.75 percent, with all countries within the range of
3-7 percent. In the simulation based on the Levine and Renelt equation (Table 9), the per
capita growth rate falls to about 4 percent. The relative per capita growth rates of the
countries also change: for example, Albania's per capita growth rate declines from 7 percent
to about 4 percent, while Estonia's ranking rises sharply. The main force that brings about this
difference is the inclusion of investment in Levine and Renelt, but not in Barro.23
Based on initial per capita income and the projected growth rates, Table 10 indicates the
number ofyears it would take for each of these economies to reach the current average per
capita income of the DECD. Given initial conditions and current economic policies, it would
take on average 35 years according to the Barro regression and 45 years according to the
Levine and Renelt equation. The best-placed countries appear to be the Czech Republic and
Estonia, which would converge in around 20-25 years according to both regressions.
We set out policy implications in Table 10, by asking how the long-term average per capita
growth would be affected if investments rates were raised and government consumption
reduced in the future. The results suggest that changes in investment ratios would have
significant implications for long-term growth. For instance, under the Levine-Renelt
specification, the numbers ofyears to reach current DECD levels declines from 45 years to 30
years as investment rates rise by 8 percentage points (from 22 percent to 30 percent), on
average. The effects of reducing government expenditure by 8 percentage points (from 18
percent to 10 percent in the Barro equation) are less noticeable, with the numbers ofyears to
reach DECD levels declining by only 6 years.
This simple exercise thus suggests that the key to rapid growth in the transition economies is
adopting policies that promote investment. It should be noted, however, that particular
attention should be given to the quality of investment. While many of the transition economies
have traditionally had high investment ratios, the efficiency of the capital stock has typically
been low. Hence, policies should focus not only on increasing the level of investment, but also
on improving its efficiency.
Finally, it should be stressed that the projections have abstracted from some potentially very
important external, political, and institutional factors. While such factors are hard to assess
23It should be noted that the projections are very sensitive to current policies (in particular
investment ratios). Since investment ratios may differ quite a bit from year to year, the
scenario below, which assumes a uniform rate of investment of30 percent ofGDP, may
convey a better, if optimistic, picture.
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quantitatively (even in the existing growth literature), they are likely to have an important
influence on the growth process.
v. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has analyzed the growth and inflation performance of the transition economies and
given a rough idea of their long-term growth potential. While it is clear that the costs of the
transition have been high (even adjusting for data problems), the goods news is that the worst
appears to be over, and most transition economies in our sample had begun to grow by 1996.
While admittedly crude, projections based on standard growth regressions suggest that it will
take around 20 years for the faster reformers to reach current OEeD per capita income levels.
Many of the transition economies have moved rapidly on several of the necessary fronts,
particularly in liberalizing the price, foreign exchange and trade regimes. In most economies,
privatization of state enterprises is still far from complete and the banking system is under
severe strain. Under these conditions, benefits from properly directed government spending on
reforms and from foreign direct investment in enhancing human and physical capital are
potentially large. While not all transition economies are equally well placed, the starting
conditions are favorable in most countries. Policies will make all the difference.
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